作为公共哲学的功利主义

摘要：功利主义作为曾经引领法律与社会改革的颠覆性理论，近来面临许多批评者的所建构的思想实验的挑战，这些挑战将使得该理论与人们的道德直觉相冲突而逐渐失去了在理论与实践领域的统治地位。尽管功利主义者试图在效用的构成和评价对象上对理论做出一系列自我修正，但在面对有关结果主义、福利主义、客观公正的利益考量与总体主义这四个基本要素的批评时他们似乎退无可退。面对如此困境，当代功利主义者罗伯特·古丁主张在适用范围上对功利主义进行限缩，他认为将功利主义作为一种公共哲学可以逆转其在私人领域所遭受的非难。但本文发现古丁的策略仍无法避免罗尔斯对于功利主义中总体主义的批评与脏手问题对于功利主义会引发公共事务中行动者内在道德紧张的责难。对此，本文参考了海萨尼的平均效用最大化和苏珊·沃尔夫的真实自我理论进行了回应。

Abstract: Utilitarianism, as a subversive theory that once led to legal and social reforms, has come in for the opponents to construct a number of thought experiments to push the theory to the opposite side of people’s moral intuition and sense of justice, which makes the theory gradually lost its dominant position in the theory of political philosophy and legislative practice. Although utilitarians have made a series of self-corrections in the theory on the composition of utility and the object of evaluation, they seem to be unable to retreat from the criticism of the four basic elements of consequentialism, welfarism, impartiality and the equal consideration of interests, and the aggregationism. To deal with such a dilemma, contemporary utilitarian Robert Goodin advocates limiting utilitarianism in its scope of application, arguing that treating utilitarianism as a public philosophy will transform the indignities it suffers in the private sphere into virtues in the public affairs. However, this paper finds that Goodin’s strategy still fails to avoid Rawls’s criticism against aggregationism in utilitarianism and the Dirty Hands Problem’s reproach that utilitarianism raises internal moral tensions in agents in public affairs. To this, the paper responds with reference to Hessani’s average utility maximization and Susan Wolf’s “real-self view”.