身后名和责任

摘要：这篇文章讨论了法律推进或限制个体和机构负责的方式。它从露丝·巴德·金斯伯格（Ruth Bader Ginsburg）法官在更利于保障宪法堕胎权的时刻没有及时退休的失败中得出两点启示。首先，本文提出了包括信息托管在内的诸多方法，有助于更好地劝阻个体可能实施的贬损或抵消他们早年名誉的行动。其次，本文为“定期总统任命”改革提供了新的经验证据，以使美国最高法院更符合民主问责的要求。

Abstract: This Essay considers the ways that the law can help or hinder the accountability of actors and institutions. It draws two implications from the failure of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg to retire at a time that would have better secured the constitutional right to abortion. First, it suggests waysincluding information escrows—that the law could better dissuade individuals from taking actions that might tarnish and counterbalance the good they’ve done earlier in their lives. Second, it provides new empirical support for “regular Presidential appointment” reforms as a way to make the United States Supreme Court more democratically accountable.